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FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT AND GENERAL HAP ARNOLD: THE STATESMAN AND  
THE STRATEGIST BUILD AN AIR FORCE

BY

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FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT AND GENERAL HAP ARNOLD: THE STATESMAN AND  
THE STRATEGIST BUILD AN AIR FORCE

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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U.S. Army War College  
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013  
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FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT AND GENERAL HAP ARNOLD:  
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Arnold was charged first and foremost with the responsibility of building an American Air Force. Roosevelt was with him all the way in his struggle against the isolationists, but only part way with him in his struggle against the interventionists, especially one of the most powerful - Henry Morgenthau, Secretary of the Treasury, whom Roosevelt had put in charge of procurement. Morgenthau was also responsible for managing the lend-lease and military grant program. On March 5, Arnold was called to testify before a house committee on the development of air power and mentioned the "giveaway" of aircraft and his air corps assets to the French and British. On March 12, 1940, Arnold was called to a White House meeting with the Cabinet, War Secretaries, and Service Chiefs. Roosevelt looked directly at Arnold and he was told that certain persons were not supporting the President's desires and that if they didn't "play ball," the President was sure he could find a suitable assignment for them on Guam.<sup>1</sup>

As a matter of fact, General Arnold did not find himself in a tropical paradise, but possibly suffering a fate much worse as far as he was concerned--he was "taboo" at the White House, a ban that would last nine months. "I was not wanted there during the conferences that determined foreign policies, the future of our Army, Navy, and, what to me was for the more

important, of the Air Force. I had a genuine worry because I had lost the confidence of the President at probably the most critical period of my career."<sup>2</sup>

To say this was an auspicious development in the nexus between the statesman and the military strategist would be an understatement at least, especially when the country was seriously starting to prepare for war. Ultimately, and fortunately, the difficulties between the two were able to be overcome and they would team up to build the greatest air force in the world which would become paramount in developing the strategy to defeat Germany and Japan and bring World War II to a close.

To understand the union between Roosevelt (FDR) and Arnold and how it developed, the study will examine the background of Arnold's career as a military officer and strategist and the development of the Army Air Service. This is important, because during this period of time Arnold became very aware (and some would say an astute observer and player) of the world of politics--both inside his own profession as well as with the civilian overseers.

The personalities of the two men are important and will be examined to determine to what extent, if any, their personal relationship and characteristics led to successes for both the



men and their country. Author Richard Betts writes:

"Personalities are unique, but the impact of individual attitudes, characteristics, ambitions, consciences and styles or the way in which officials influence leaders can be conceived in terms of several categories. A few people's actions, advice, and influence are relatively unconstrained by the formal limits of their office's purview. They inspire such awe and admiration that their opinions on any subject of importance, and their reputation and appeal to public or legislative constituencies are so great that they are powers in their own right."<sup>3</sup>

This statement describes Hap Arnold perfectly.

The greatest part of the study will focus on the time frame of 1938-1945, when there were two strategies being pursued simultaneously: Arnold's own long-term personal strategy to develop an independent Air Force, and the national military strategy of defeating Germany and Japan. This study will examine what impact or influence the strategist may have had with the statesman in achieving the "ends." How much influence the military strategists exerted has been and will continue to be in great dispute depending on the particular source. "The problem is not only that the boundaries between policy, strategy, and tactics are rarely clear, but that civilian leaders may insist on the right to control operations because of their political implications."<sup>4</sup> Military historian Kent Greenfield asserts, "No question has arisen regarding the extent to which President Roosevelt exercised his powers,

personal or professional, as leader of the American nation between 1939 and 1945. For better or worse, he dominated the scene."<sup>5</sup> What affect he had on determining the use of military resources or strategy is much disputed, however. Author Robert Sherman has found that not more than two times did FDR overrule the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Author John Ehrman in Grand Strategy concurs, as does General George Marshall who stated that FDR carried out JCS strategy after making decisions between courses of action put forth by the JCS. Historian Professor William Emmerson, however, states "more than twenty times FDR submitted his wisdom/judgement for the JCS decision."<sup>7</sup> Greenfield, referencing the Joint Board, Munitions Board, the JCS, Procurement and the Military Production Board all reporting directly to the White House, goes on to say, "Nothing could signify more clearly that Mr. Roosevelt intended to wield the military power of the U.S. with his own hands and not through the Secretaries of War and Navy. From July 1939 until Pearl Harbor, FDR made all of his important military decisions regarding the use of American military power either independently of his military chiefs, or against their advice or over their protests."<sup>8</sup> As can be seen, there is much room for further evaluation of the statesman-strategist nexus!

This study will look at the impacts of the relationship between FDR and General Arnold to see if there were lessons to be learned, either from success or failures.

### BACKGROUND

Three months after we (the United States) got into the war the Army Air Forces, an inexperienced young giant, took its seat beside the Army and Navy at the high table of the American military organization and in the councils of the Allies. Three years before it had been only a specialty corps, on a footing with the Signal Corps or the Army Engineers. Three years later it had created the mightiest air force that had ever existed.<sup>9</sup>

How was Army Aviation able to advance so rapidly? From his early entry into aviation in 1911 with ten other pioneers, Arnold was one of two still alive after five years. While throughout its development there were several other notable aviation pioneers and military officers, Eric Larrabee asserts that it was "Hap Arnold who fathered the American Air Force. In the six years, beginning in 1938, when he took command, he led it from an unimpressive twenty thousand men and a few hundred semi-obsolete aircraft to a total of 2.4 million men and 80,000 aircraft."<sup>10</sup> To build this great air force, and to impact the outcome of World War II, Arnold had to become more than just a strategist. In the following chapters it will

become apparent that he also had to be somewhat of a "politician" and a statesman to build the coalition or relationship with the civilian statesmen, primarily FDR, to successfully achieve the aforementioned strategies. "A man of great vision and courage, he (Arnold) walked with and counseled the leaders of his generation, Franklin D. Roosevelt and George Marshall, Winston Churchill and Britain's military men."<sup>11</sup>

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## CHAPTER II

### THE GROWTH OF HAP ARNOLD AND ARMY AVIATION

Henry Arnold entered West Point under odd circumstances. His older brother, a student at Penn State was scheduled to take the entrance exam, but decided he wanted to remain at Penn State University instead. Dr. Arnold, father and well-known medical doctor said he'd arranged for the test and one of his boys was going to take the test! Henry was sent, the test was taken and passed, and young Henry Arnold was on his way to West Point.

While at the Academy, Arnold was not known for his military genius, academic abilities, or professionalism. He was well known, however, for his happy, friendly disposition and his "high jinks" as a member of the "Black Hand" group, cadets that were continually involved in campus capers and practical jokes. By the time of his graduation in 1909, he had managed to finish academically in the upper half of his class, but militarily never even reached the rank of cadet corporal! His performance was lackluster enough to earn him an assignment to the infantry instead of his desired and most coveted cavalry. This "undesired" assignment was to provide Arnold his first opportunity to try "power politics" in his military

career. "Flanked by the representative of his congressional district and the senior senator from Pennsylvania, Arnold made a frontal attack on the Adjutant General of the U.S. Army to protest his assignment to the Infantry." Arnold lost, and shortly thereafter was on his way to the Philippines.

#### THE ARMY CAREER AND AVIATION DEVELOPMENT

In 1911, Arnold returned to the United States and the Army Signal Corps (the initial home for aviation) to begin his career in Army aviation as one of the first two pilots to receive the Army's pilot license. The other officer was a Lt. Tom Milling. It is at this point that we can start to see the development of the "vision" Arnold had for the potential of air power. Capitalizing on the current popular "craze" of flying machines in that time period and working closely with the Wright Brothers, the two Army aviators began setting new aerial records (flight to altitude, distances, etc.) as well as developing new uses for aircraft (reconnaissance, as a weapons platform by shooting ground targets with a rifle, and mail/courier service, etc.) besides the primary mission of training additional pilots. Flying out of College Park Airport, Maryland, they were very close to the nation's capital and hence they were constantly in the press and public eye. By the

summer of 1911, "Arnold and Milling had become minor celebrities around Washington. Arnold definitely felt the glamour of being an aviator during visits to Washington restaurants and parties..."<sup>2</sup> Political and social contact were now part of popular Lt. Arnold's life as he was called to give testimony before Congress on aviation issues and give public speeches on the capabilities of airplanes. He was also developing a keen sense of the media and the importance of public exposure. All of these experiences would be of benefit in the future.

Flying was not all fun and games, and after several accidents which took the lives of several of his compatriots and almost Arnold himself, he returned with his wife and expanding family to the Infantry and the Philippines in 1913. It was there he first met a Lt. George C. Marshall, whom Arnold predicted "would someday be the Army Chief of Staff."<sup>3</sup> He returned from the Philippines shortly before World War I, got back into aviation, and went to Panama to develop a pursuit squadron as the commander. With the entrance of the U.S. into the war, Arnold returned to Washington, D.C. to become the Public Information Officer of the Air Service. During the war, aviation made inroads into the combat arena primarily in the reconnaissance of air observation role with minor roles in the

anti-balloon, air combat, and ground attack. After the war and returning from Europe convinced that the potential for air power was much greater than displayed or used, was Colonel Billy Mitchell, now assigned as Deputy to the Air Chief. He began a public fight for an independent air force which would merge Army and Navy air units and not be dependent on resources from those services. Mitchell contended that in total war air power would dominate ground and sea forces.<sup>4</sup> According to Larrabee, "military aviation was a dedicated fraternity. Its members saw a different world from that of sailors or other soldiers. They tended to become somewhat fanatical about their faith in air power, especially when it was greeted elsewhere in the services--as it almost invariably was--by incomprehension and obstructionism."<sup>5</sup> Mitchell was set to take every opportunity to prove his beliefs in the capabilities of air power over the next six years.

Mitchell, in September 1919 testimony before Congress concerning the ability to sink ships with air power, revealed a signed copy of a naval reorganization plan that was designed to prevent the Air Service from taking over the responsibility of all aviation. When the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Franklin Roosevelt, was called for follow-up testimony before the same committee, he was caught totally unaware of this



reorganization plan when questioned by the committee and was embarrassed. This would make Arnold's future job more difficult (especially after he supported Mitchell in his court-martial proceedings in 1925).

Mitchell, as Deputy Chief, continued to press for more aviation capability and pressed especially hard against the Navy, which he considered the prime obstacle in the development of air power. Mitchell thought the problem was "entrenched Admirals unable to face the fact that sea power was done for." There were several old-fashioned generals in the War Department that were a big part of the problem too.<sup>6</sup> With much infighting amongst the Services and within Congress, Mitchell was finally able to get permission for his big test--to try and sink navy ships--primarily through President Harding who liked what Mitchell had to say, his insights, and the way he operated.<sup>7</sup> In June and July of 1921, Mitchell's air power lived up to his claims. First, a captured German submarine was sunk, then a destroyer, a cruiser, and at last the German Battleship "Ostfreisland."

The next few years were turbulent. Shortly after the successful ship bombing, the Air Service commander, tired of Mitchell's activities, requested to the Secretary of War that Mitchell be replaced. He agreed with the thought, but "nobody

in Washington was going to tangle with the popular Billy Mitchell." The press got wind of the proposal, supported Mitchell unanimously, and suggested that there were other changes (in service leadership) that should be made.<sup>8</sup> In the meantime, Arnold worked industriously to build up America's land based strength. Much of his energy went to selling the importance of preparedness and aerial defenses to the General Staff, Congress, and the Bureau of the Budget.<sup>9</sup> In August of 1924, the air service was still in a moribund state and constantly had to beg for money. But Arnold did what he could to keep air power in the minds of his countrymen: forest fire patrols, speed records, air refuelings, and the first planned around the world flight.<sup>10</sup>

Mitchell's tenure as the Deputy ended shortly into 1925 with a new President named Coolidge as the final arbitrator. Observed Arnold, "That circus whip of Billy's was now cracking in a manner which many quarters in Washington noticed. I saw that half the time it wasn't what Billy said, but the way he said it that made him enemies."<sup>11</sup> This was a lesson Arnold would remember later. In 1925, Mitchell was not reappointed as the Deputy Chief, was sent to Fort Sam Houston, Texas, demoted to Colonel, and put in charge of the base. It didn't quiet him down. Two naval air crashes caused him to release a 6000 word

press statement. The "terrible accidents...are the direct results of incompetence, criminal negligence, and almost treasonably administration of the national defense by the War and Navy Departments." He also pointed out that all aviation policies were made by non-flying men.<sup>12</sup> His court-martial occurred quickly thereafter!

Concerning one of the most famous court-martials that have ever been held by the U.S. military, Arnold said:

As the testimony of any of us who were called to the trial to testify shows, the whole air service was angry. After much long service in Washington we had many friends, in Congress and the press. We continued to keep up the fight. At once, the boom was lowered with a bang. The case was unpopularly closed--there was no thought of allowing a small fry to keep it going. It was understood now that President Coolidge himself had been the prime accuser.<sup>13</sup>

After Mitchell was out, Arnold picked up the cause and got the opportunity to learn another lesson in dealing with statesmen, politicians and his military leaders. In October 1925, Arnold had testified before a Presidential fact-finding board and expressed his candid thoughts. Secret or surreptitious releases to the press continued to make the news, keeping aviation in the spotlight. Then, in February 1926, Arnold was called into the Chief of the Air Service, Major General Patrick, and told that as a result of Arnold's attempts

at "influencing legislation in a manner forbidden by regulations and otherwise decidedly objectionable, he had two choices. You can resign from the Army or you can take a court-martial."<sup>14</sup> Arnold had 24 hours to make the decision. The next day he told General Patrick that he would take the court-martial. The choice clearly put the War Department on the spot. There was no way the Army was going to go through another court-martial of a highly popular officer four months after the Mitchell trial. The heat would be too great. Arnold was queried about the worst assignment possible in the Army, and he said to be stationed at Fort Riley, Kansas. He was off to Fort Riley shortly thereafter, out of the Washington spotlight, to be commander of an observation squadron.

The next two years at Ft. Riley were uneventful (relatively speaking). Arnold had an application on file to go to the Army Command and General Staff School. In 1928, his chain of command thought it was time that he should attend the school. A letter was sent to the Commandant at Leavenworth to see if they could fit one more officer in the school. The Commandant asked, "who," and when Arnold's name came back, the reply was, "they didn't want him, but if the Assistant Secretary of War did, he would naturally be accepted" (The Commandant had served on the court in the Mitchell trial)!

After completion of school, Arnold went to the Materiel Command in Ohio until 1931. In the fall of 1931, he was reassigned to take operational command of March Field, California, in what he claims were five good years (1931-1936).

Arnold's primary mission was to convert a training base into a combat wing with two pursuit squadrons and one bomber squadron and to develop offensive employment tactics. While much went on during this period, there were at least five points that would some impact on Arnold's future dealings with statesmen. The first area was that of publicity. Arnold was close to the movie capital of the world and he capitalized on that proximity. Throughout this time period, he lent technical support to the movie producers who were pushing aviation, and cultivated friendships with many of the stars who would later come back to help in the war effort. Second, an opportunity presented itself to show that Arnold was not afraid to make decisions in absence of his commander. An earthquake occurred in Long Beach, California in 1933. Arnold tried to contact the Commanding General, responsible for all of California, at his headquarters in San Francisco but no person knew of his whereabouts. Arnold "didn't sit around waiting for details. Arnold sent troops and supplies immediately,"<sup>15</sup> When the Commanding General finally got into the loop, his first action

was to prefer court-martial charges against Arnold for misappropriation of government property! Third, Arnold had the opportunity to learn who the boss was once more. In the spring of 1933, his wing was hosting the first major air corps maneuvers with participants from all over the country. His post was full of personnel, forcing many to live in tar paper barracks that were built in World War I. The request came, "can you take care of 1500 CCC boys at your station next week?" Arnold sent back a message stating that he could not at present due to the maneuvers. Arnold learned the importance of the program rapidly--the hard way. The reply to him was, "You probably do not understand. This is an Executive Order of the President....can you take 3000 CCC boys immediately."<sup>16</sup>

The fourth and fifth events both involved Roosevelt and Arnold directly. The government was involved in a dispute with the commercial airlines over mail carrying contracts. The President asked the Chief of the Air Service if they could carry the mail, and General Foulois said yes. The Air Corps was given ten days to prepare, and in a showdown, the government cancelled the commercial contracts. Unfortunately, the Air Corps did not have the trained personnel or the instrument equipped planes to handle this mission, and it proved to be a dismal failure, costing several Air Corps pilot

lives and lost aircraft. Roosevelt's political opponents had a field day. In the Senate, one Senator leveled charges of "inhuman, un-American, indefensible conduct" against Roosevelt and added "the whole country is calling for a stop to this legalized murder." Army Chief of Staff Mac Aurther had picked up General Foullois after being summoned to the White House and told him, "the President is extremely upset by the public reaction." When they reached the White House, the President asked, "when are these killings going to stop General?" It was a rhetorical question as the President had already cancelled the program. The President was not pleased with his Air Corps, nor was the Army Chief of Staff. FDR had laid the failure of the plan on Mac Aurther's doorstep and the Postal Service. Out on the west coast, there was little Arnold could do or say to change the situation.

He did have the opportunity to testify in November 1934 to the Baker Board, which was looking into the feasibility of an independent Air Corps, seemingly a fine opportunity to "bury" himself once again, but he did not. Of the meeting, author Copp said, "no longer the fiery rebel of the twenties, he'd (Arnold) come a long way in nine years--from eviction to major command. At forty-eight, he was one of a handful of Air Corps officers who could look forward to rank of General. He had

become a good political boxer. He knew how to bob and-weave, when to hold firm and when to give."<sup>18</sup>

The fifth and final significant event involved Arnold leading a flight of B-10 bombers in 1934 on a round trip flight from Washington D.C. to Alaska. The flight each way would be non-stop to demonstrate the capability of long range aircraft to strike anywhere in the World. The flight was successful and the message was not missed by the President as he presented the Mackay Trophy for aerial achievement to Hap Arnold. In 1935, General Foulois was replaced by General Westover as the Chief of the Air Corps. Westover had requested Arnold to be the Assistant Chief, and in January 1936, Arnold was on his way to Washington once again.

#### Assistant Chief of the Air Corps

The Air Corps was not in much better shape than it was when Arnold left several years before. FDR had abolished the Assistant Secretary of War for Air position in 1933 for economy reasons (it has been said that Mac Arthur was behind it) and General Mac Arthur had made clear his views for the present and the future--no change in the status quo for five years. There were those who felt the new air corps leadership would be able to change those doubters. "...we have a very fine combination



in Westover and Arnold. Westover can do all the detail work and Arnold can sell our ideas to the General Staff, Bureau of the Budget, and to Congress..."<sup>19</sup>

Watching world events, Arnold kept up the pressure for developing greater air power and especially the long range bomber. Relationships with the Navy in competition for resources had not diminished at all. The Navy thought the air force should be for ground support and coastal defense while the Navy prevented adversaries from reaching the U.S. Shores. Totally contrary was Arnold's "strategic vision:

"More and more, war in the air is becoming a constant threat throughout the world. The Atlantic and Pacific Ocean will shrink in "air-travel size" and present the same flying time and hazard that the Mediterranean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico do today. No nation will have but one frontier to guard, for hostile aircraft may approach from any and all directions."<sup>20</sup>

The fact that the United States in 1937 continued to rank seventh among nations in air power irked Arnold, who disliked knowing that his country was weak in what he thought it should be strong. Arnold had long believed that long-range strategic bombing would determine the winner of any future war. He gained the reputation as the champion of the big bombers and high-altitude daylight precision bombing.<sup>21</sup> However, the independent employment of bombers was contrary to the views of

the General Staff, let alone the Navy. Neither believed that a plane could dictate the culminating point of a battle, but only be a helpful adjunct. As the United States headed into 1938, circumstances and the world situation would change. The increasing likelihood of war would lead to a symbiotic relationship between the preeminent statesman of the United States, Roosevelt, and the once unwanted General Arnold. Together they would create the world's greatest air force.

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## CHAPTER III

### ROOSEVELT AND ARNOLD: POWERFUL PERSONALITIES

What were the personalities of these two leaders? If they were both strong leaders, would difficulties arise when their opinions, policies, strategies, and ways to get things done differed? Part of the reason for tracing Arnold's background in the previous chapter was to develop the idea, primarily of Arnold and to a lesser extent Roosevelt, of what motivated them and what they thought was important. To actually state what the "personality" of an individual is at best difficult if not impossible. Understandably, biographers tend to have much higher opinions of their subjects than did just authors or historians. It was also noted that the particular strategy or policy adopted, such as the decision to fire bomb Dresden, would be viewed or interpreted differently by different authors. The bottom line is that personal prejudices affect the viewpoint. This chapter will lay out the views of several authors through direct comments as well as highlight actions taken by the two men to let the reader develop his/her own opinion as to the personality. The prime consideration for looking at the personality is to see if they had any influence

on the actions of the two men who would work closely to develop air power and prosecute the upcoming war.

### FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT

Being that Roosevelt was a politician, one would naturally assume there would be differences of opinion of the decisions he made. Author Greenfield gives the impression Roosevelt was somewhat aloof. He asserts:

"FDR had a characteristic preference for getting things done by indirection. He seldom declared his motives, and unlike Mr. Churchill, he did not thrash things out with his adversaries. He disliked and avoided argument with them and preferred to work in ways that were highly irregular and personal. He listened to advice only when he chose, and he sought it only on occasion. He was disposed to let things happen instead of giving orders, when he saw that they were likely to happen the way he wished. And as often as not, when the experts confronted him with a conflict between a military end and a declared insufficiency of means, he breezily ordered both his military chiefs and his production chiefs to do what was necessary, always confident that they could do more than they declared to do possible."<sup>1</sup>

Historian James, when reviewing U.S. strategy in the Pacific and Roosevelt's actions, felt that Roosevelt paid "lip service" to the important postwar friendships the United States wanted with China and Australia, but both were treated as quite unequal partners with America and Britain during the war.<sup>2</sup>

Copp, analyzing the continuing feuds between the Secretary of War Woodring, and his assistant, Johnson, observed, "conflict grew increasingly bitter, but FDR did nothing to stop it. He had a penchant for playing his appointees off against each other so he (FDR) could make the final decision, keeping them and everyone else in doubt."<sup>3</sup> Copp went on to mention an attack from the press on Roosevelt's "vaunted infallibility" and their attacks on his "precipitous action" against the airmail carriers. Roosevelt tried to lay the blame for the failure off on Mac Arthur, who said he didn't know anything about the situation even though Roosevelt "asked" him twice to confirm his (Mac Arthur's) involvement.<sup>4</sup> Roosevelt could also get in the "perks" business as he put out an edict, after a dispute with Arnold, that military planes would no longer be made available for anything but official business. This edict quickly became highly selective, with the planes usually benefiting those congressman and functionaries that the White House favored.<sup>5</sup>

Roosevelt also had a long memory for those who opposed him politically. Two prominent individuals were never able to be commissioned in the Air Corps because of "differences" with FDR. Charles Lindbergh had received a medal from Herman Goering and was an isolationist politically. As a civilian,

Arnold used him to gather intelligence from his world wide contacts, and more importantly, as a aircraft consultant and test pilot (flying P-38's, he shot down three Zero's). The other individual was Robert Woods, President of Sears, Roebuck Co., who served three years as a civilian while managing the Air Corps procurement and distribution system.<sup>6</sup>

Another interesting aspect of personal appointments involved some of his own political appointees. Roosevelt distrusted the foreign service and let the State Department play little role in making the decisions of World War II.

Roosevelt's relationship with his military advisors during the 1938-1945 time frame was best described by the Marshall assessment of one of cooperation, which was confirmed by Arnold. There were differences of opinions on the means to achieve the ends and there were many political considerations involved that the military did not care for--not much different than today. The bottom line was that FDR was a strong personality who left no doubt in anybody's mind of who the Command-in-Chief was and who was running the war.

#### GENERAL HAP ARNOLD

Probably the best summary (several others had basically the same views) was a rather lengthy observation by Larrabee who said:

"That Arnold ever ended up in senior command was of itself remarkable. Time and again he overstepped the bounds, taking actions on his own that his superiors neither had authorized nor willing to countenance in retrospect."<sup>7</sup>

"His boyish good spirits were so engaging that, whatever the President's momentary annoyance with him, he ultimately became one member of the Joint Chiefs whose company Roosevelt genuinely seemed to enjoy."<sup>8</sup>

"Arnold had the dream and inner drive to undertake a great mission, but neither the brains nor the organizing capacity to carry through on it. His idea of administration, writes Thomas Coffey, was to think of something that ought to be done and tell somebody else to go do it right away. Fortunately he had the good sense to recognize his limitations and to form an alliance that compensated for them."<sup>9</sup>

Other random comments throughout Larrabee's book suggested that Arnold was always one step ahead of everybody else, tended to overboard when he talked about air power, but was unique amongst Allied leaders in his totally open-ended attitude toward the future. Arnold was never deterred. His duty was to "shout onward" to state the needs and make sure every effort was made to meet the President's program.

DuPre had several thoughts on characteristics that made up the Arnold personality. He thought Arnold was "best known as an innovator with a ready smile and dedication to hard work."<sup>10</sup> Arnold had "a superb sense of public relations, partly from



instinct and partly from information officer jobs he had held. From his contacts in science to Hollywood, he saw a use for anybody he had ever known, from the arts and sciences to Hollywood stars to serve his cause. Gable, Webb, Stewert, and Holden all joined the Air Corps, while Hollywood shot films expounding the glamour and effectiveness of air power. Arnold even saw a place for women in his Air Force and started the Women's Air Service Pilots."<sup>11</sup>

In referencing Arnold, biographer Coffey noted, "While he often ignored Army procedures and was considered an abysmal administrator, he was unequalled in his ability to get things done."<sup>12</sup> This was the second reference to this important trait. Where did it come from? Arnold said, "more than anyone I have ever known or read about, the Wright brothers gave me the sense that nothing was impossible."<sup>13</sup>

Arnold was smart enough to adapt to the intricacies of political reality. Early on, "Arnold was not able to contain his well-known tendency toward outspokenness in the relationship much crucial to his job tenure, namely with the President."<sup>14</sup> FDR got Arnold's attention after he testified before Congress against the President's lend-lease program. Arnold did not get to participate in White House meetings for nine months from March through October 1940. Shortly

thereafter, Arnold became one of his most trusted and the longest serving advisor. His status at the White House was never in jeopardy again.

In examining the personality traits of the two men, I found they were both strong willed, each thinking they knew what was right for the country. Once Arnold figured out who the boss was, a relationship of total trust and confidence developed between the two leaders. The trust on the part of the President was such that Arnold even handled diplomatic concerns on behalf of the President, especially in the Pacific Theater. Additionally, once war was inevitable, Roosevelt gave Arnold total support to run his Air Corps as he saw fit, even if it short-changed the other service components. The two characteristics that Arnold had which were the most important to Roosevelt were his "driven" mind set (Type A) and his ability to get things done, regardless of the obstacles. This will be seen in the following chapter.

An observation by author James on the overall senior military leadership in WWII is appropriate. James asserts, "...by and large, the senior military and naval officers did not reach their top positions during the war by deceitful or conniving means. Rather, the evolution of the United States high command of 1941-1945 concerned politics in less

sensational ways. Through the relations and competition between men involved in roles of power and leadership.<sup>15</sup>

#### ENDNOTES

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3. Copp, DeWitt S., A Few Great Captains, Garden City, New York, Doubleday, 1980, p. 402.

4. Ibid., p. 188.

5. Ibid., p. 413.

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7. Larrabee, Eric, Commander in Chief. Franklin Delano Roosevelt. His Lieutenants, and Their War, New York, Simon and Schuster Inc., 1988, p. 209.

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11. Ibid., p. 95.

12. Coffey, Thomas M., Hap: The Story Behind the U.S. Air Force and the Man Who Built It, New York, Viking Press, 1982, p. 10.

13. Ibid., p. 47.

14. James, p. 13.

15. Ibid., p. 267.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE BUILDING OF THE AIR ARMADA

#### ARNOLD BECOMES CHIEF OF THE AIR CORPS

Heretofore nations surrounded by vast expenses of water felt reasonably secure from immediate invasion. It was thought there would be time to prepare for meeting hostile invading armies and fleets after the declaration of war. All thinking men now realize that that time is past—that national strife may even be borne to conclusion within a few hours after its inception. This means that the nation which has the preponderant air fleet ready to take the air on mobilization day is likely to be victorious. Heretofore men in uniform bore the brunt. Not so in your conflict of the morrow. Tons of explosive will fall from giant bombers—within a few hours after the next war starts—on the public utilities of the most important cities, industrial centers, arteries of communication, sea lanes, harbors—the vital critical areas of the contending powers. The safest place in the next war will probably be in the trenches. It is behind the line, along the nerve centers of commerce, that life will reach the height of insecurity.<sup>1</sup>

Those words, spoken by Arnold in 1934, were rapidly becoming closer to reality in 1938. Japan had already moved into Manchuria several years earlier and into China in 1937. Hitler was on the move in Europe. The isolationists were still exerting the most influence on the American political scene, keeping possible U.S. involvement and defense spending at the absolute minimum. Inter-service squabbling for the few defense

dollars kept each other at arm's length. The Air Corps' attempts to become a separate service had failed twice, and the current world situation preempted continuing the campaign. The Air Corps leadership needed all efforts to be directed at developing an air force for the war that was looming on the horizon. An officer named George Marshall had been appointed as Assistant Chief of Staff for the Army, and Hap Arnold, still trying to get support for his bomber force, was looking to take down whoever stood in his way. The closer the long-range bomber came to actuality, the stiffer the opposition became to it in the Army ground forces and in the War Department. Money for the military was scarce and the General Staff did not want to see a huge chunk of it spent on an idea that had never really been tested in war. At the time, the Secretary of War, Harry Woodring, believed the nation's only military need was to defend its shores.<sup>2</sup>

In early September 1938, departing from an inspection tour of an aircraft plant in California, General Westover, the Chief of the Air Corps, was killed in his own plane crash. Who would be the choice to replace him? The Deputy was the normal rotation. On September 12, Roosevelt and his most trusted aide who had great influence on him, Harry Hopkins, were in FDR's railroad car in Minnesota listening to a radio broadcast by

Hitler. Roosevelt supposedly snapped off the radio and told Hopkins to go looking immediately for new aircraft factory sites on the West Coast. "The President was sure then, that we were going to get into war, and that he believed that air power would win it."<sup>3</sup>

By September 28, the President had not named the Chief of the Air Corps. He had been hesitant to name Arnold because the general was falsely reported to be an alcoholic. Harry Hopkins knew the rumors were false and knew Arnold's capabilities. He was able to correct the misconceptions. The White House had called a meeting on the 28th: FDR was concerned about the European situation. "A new Army post in Wyoming would not scare Hitler one goddammed bit." What he wanted was airplanes; it was airplanes that would have an influence on Hitler. When other service chiefs tried to discuss their issues, FDR cut them off. They were here to talk airplanes and how to get them.<sup>3</sup> Arnold gave an assessment of the European air power situation, a short air power lesson, and reviewed the Air Corps buy of aircraft for fiscal 1940--178 planes. His performance must have been acceptable, as the next day, Roosevelt appointed him Chief of the Air Corps.

Larrabee asserts that, "Arnold's upward progress, when it came, owed a lot to positioning, to being at the right place at the right time with the right position."<sup>4</sup> While timing is important it is not the critical consideration. Based on James' earlier reference to the senior leaders and several congratulatory letters sent to him by both military and civilian leaders, confidence in his abilities were the overarching consideration. Typical was a note from the Governor of Missouri, "I think the Army is most fortunate to have you at the head of the Air Corps, especially at a time when a war, which may ultimately involve our country, is imminent."<sup>5</sup> In the end, he had the confidence of the President, hence no other opinions mattered. Enough of the niceties, what did the future hold?

Coffey had the best summary of what Arnold was to face the next three years, that which would tax his military strategist and political compromise skills:

"Since becoming chief in September 1938, he had discovered that to build the Army Air Corps into the fighting force that might one day be needed, he had to overcome resistance not only from America's politically powerful isolationists, who opposed defense spending because they were against involvement in any foreign war, but also from some of the country's interventionists, who approved of defense spending but who believed that half or more of the nation's meager aircraft production should be sent to the now desperate French and British."<sup>6</sup>

### MILITARY ADVICE, 1938-1941

By 1938, Arnold had become much more politically sophisticated over the years. He had learned that on Roosevelt's staff, there was only one person who had real influence with the President--Harry Hopkins. Arnold cultivated that relationship. It was already obvious that the President wanted airplanes for his Air Corps as a result of the Nov. 14, 1938 White House meeting. Arnold now only needed to convince the rest of the War Department!

For the next three years, the War Department was in constant competition for scarce funds. Congressional alliances as well as military alliances weighed in. The Air Corps was involved in Presidentially directed exercises to evaluate the capability of bombers to locate "enemy ships" at great distances from U.S. shores. On both occasions, the bombers were successful; but the Navy classified the results of the exercises to keep them from the public and nullifying the publicity the Air Corps wanted. After the second test, when the bombers found the target ship 600 miles out, Arnold relates, "somebody in the Navy apparently got in touch with somebody on the General Staff, and in less time than it takes



to tell about it, the War Department had sent down an order limiting activities of the Air Corps to within 100 miles from the shoreline of the United States.<sup>9</sup> Additionally a War Department decision was made that "no requirement exists for procurement of experimental pressure cabin bombers (read B-17s) in the fiscal year 39 or 40, only aircraft for close air support, pursuit, and medium bombers were needed. Secrecy was so tight amongst the services that Arnold was not privy to naval intercepts concerning Japanese activities in the Pacific, and on the night of December 6, 1941, Arnold personally dispatched a squadron of B-17 bombers to Hawaii, totally unaware of what was about to happen.<sup>9</sup> This is the backdrop for five examples of Arnold's interaction with his President to shape policy, or strategy, or to meet the President's requirements.

As mentioned earlier, the President did not have great confidence in what should have been two prime players of his cabinet. The Secretary of State was rarely involved in meetings considering war business. Even Secretary of War Woodring was rarely asked for (to include the November 14 meeting) or provided meaningful input. Even when FDR replaced Woodring with Henry Stimson, Roosevelt was not necessarily satisfied. Larrabee notes, "Stimson had taken his appointment

as tacit approval of his (Stimson's) views... But the President showed increasing signs of being reluctant to go that far and there had come to be a coolness between them."<sup>10</sup> The cabinet member that had any pull was Secretary of Treasury Morgenthau, and in 1940, that would change. The President himself was going to carry out his foreign policy and chair all strategy meetings with the allies, his trusted aide Hopkins, and his military advisors of whom Marshall had become his prime advisor. From 1940 on, when Arnold went to England, he served as a confidant of Churchill and as a messenger between the two statesmen. At his first major conference, the Atlantic Charter Conference, Arnold provided three principles to the President, which he accepted and was to use in negotiating support to Britain prior to the U.S. entrance in the war.<sup>11</sup> By 1941, Arnold had gained the complete trust and confidence of the President (even after his banishment in 1940). From then on, Arnold attended every major conference with the President.

Roosevelt had great confidence in Arnold's ability to get things done ("nothing was impossible") and as a great political asset with lots of credibility with Congress. Copp notes, "within the confines of his position, Arnold had become an astute politician. He had learned to play the game of compromise."<sup>12</sup> In respect to his ability to get things done,

the President had created an unbelievable logistical problem for Arnold with his plan to build 50,000 aircraft by 1940.

While the thought of all those aircraft was music to Arnold's ears, the President did not understand the logistics behind the training and maintaining of the pilots and mechanics to operate the planes! Arnold, through his civilian contacts and his persuasive nature, was able to convince eight civilian schools to put up all the front money to start training prior to Congressional authorization or appropriation!

In the November 1938 elections, Roosevelt had lost his overwhelming Congressional majority (down from a 244-93 majority in the House, a 58-46 majority in the Senate). He was facing a heavily isolationist body, and had difficulty in gaining support to fund his defense programs, especially big ticket items like airplanes. Arnold continued to testify on the virtues of air power and was making successful headway. In his State of the Union address on January 4, 1939, FDR had expressed a "paramount need for air power in a world that had grown hostile, and where boundaries had shrunk."<sup>13</sup> Arnold kept up the pressure and in 1940 (with the fall of France) many Congressmen shed their isolationist skin and asked him not "who are we going to fight," but, "how much do you need, and how much can you use?" Between January 1940 and October 8, 1940, \$2.4-billion was turned over to the Air Corps.<sup>14</sup>

The third example concerned the establishment of an Air Corps that was independent of control by the Army. The fight for independence dated back to the Billy Mitchell days and was twice defeated, once under a Roosevelt administration. With the approaching war, Arnold put the "independence" issue on the back burner (and was considered a turncoat by many in the Air Corps). However, as the Air Corps expanded in size and was taking up a larger role in future strategic planning as well as a significantly larger portion of the budget, the need for autonomy became more necessary. In October 1940, George Marshall told FDR that he wanted Arnold (who was still currently banned from the White House) promoted and made a Deputy Chief of Staff, which Roosevelt did on October 30, 1940. In November, the Secretary of War recreated the post of Assistant Secretary of War for Air, with Robert Lovett being appointed to the position.<sup>15</sup> It was a perfect match for Arnold--his vision, strategy, and technical knowledge, and Lovett's political savvy and influence with the President. By December, France had fallen and the President had mended the rift with Arnold, due much to the efforts of Hopkins and Marshall and their extreme confidence in Arnold's abilities. In June 1941, Arnold's plan for reorganization of the Air Corps for more autonomy won Presidential approval. Arnold had

concrete authorization to build his strategic bombing force without hindrance from Army ground commanders.<sup>16</sup>

The fourth example, which was the most difficult time for Arnold to influence policy, was the result of a disagreement over the merits of military equipment sales and/or the lend-lease program. During the November 14, 1938 White House meeting when Roosevelt said, "I want lots of airplanes," Arnold thought he meant airplanes for his Air Corps. Roosevelt had only laid half of his plan on the table (some critics would say characteristically). He had his Secretary of the Treasury, Morgenthau, already rewriting the laws regarding the sales of military supplies to other nations and negotiating sales of aircraft and ships to the French and British. Throughout 1938-1939, Arnold tried every possible way to preclude the majority of U.S. production from being sold overseas. Testifying to Congress on the "selling of the store," and an aircraft accident with a French diplomat on board that embarrassed Roosevelt, did not endear Arnold to FDR. The strategist and the statesman were working at cross-purposes, different objectives. The President felt he must sell aircraft to France as "our own first line of defense." Greenfield asserts that the foundation of American strategy was, "the national interest of the United States required the survival of Great Britain and

postwar freedoms of action as a great power."<sup>17</sup> Arnold agreed in principle with the sales as it would allow our plants to expand in capacity but, "at the same time my obligations to my own country and our own Air Corps were definite--a realistic line must be drawn or there would only be a paper air force."<sup>18</sup> Once again, in March 1940, Arnold gave testimony to Congress displeasing to the President on the lend-lease program. FDR had enough! Arnold was out as an advisor to the President!

Marshall had to become the air power mouthpiece. At a White House meeting on September 27, 1940, Marshall explained the Air Corps situation. Morgenthau was pressing to take more B-17s from the Air Corps to provide to Britain. Marshall boldly announced that the Air Corps only had 49 bombers left that were fit for combat. Stimson noted that when Marshall made his observation, "that the President's head went back as if somebody had hit him in the chest."<sup>19</sup> Shortly thereafter, the President realized that Arnold had been correct in his assessment. Arnold's promotion followed shortly, the White House ban ended, and Arnold's tenure was never threatened again.

The last example of Arnold's influence involved the strategic direction of the war and the role of air power. This involved the fighter-bomber controversy. The Navy wanted to

keep the Air Corps in fighters and light bombers only so they (Navy) could be the long-range defenders of the seas and shores. The isolationists would claim that the long-range bombers gave the U.S. an offensive capability. Arnold, Lovett, and eventually Hopkins were all convinced that it was the bomber that would have the greatest impact on the war from an air power perspective. In June 1941, Roosevelt concurred with Arnold's program and sent a memo which eliminated all objections to the bomber program. It ended up a very wise decision, because as the war progressed, the demands for long-range bombers, even by the Navy, and for the Pacific campaign were coming from all quarters.

The following quotes summarize the 1938-1941 time frame relating to the strategist's effort, sometimes successful, sometimes not, and put the time frame in perspective. In August 1940, Secretary of War Stimson said, "Air power has decided the fate of nations; Germany, with her powerful air armadas, has vanquished one people after another. On the ground, large armies mobilized to resist her, but each time it was additional power in the air that decided the fate of each individual nation. The French Army, despite 3,500,000 men, proved inadequate. French deficiency in air power, to a large extent, explained the subsequent disaster."<sup>20</sup> Coffey's

analysis of the situation, despite all of Arnold's efforts, after the attack Pearl Harbor, was somewhat pessimistic. "The most hideous aspects of the situation were now bearing down on Arnold. For three years he had been warning President Roosevelt that if too many airplanes were being sent to England, the U.S. might end up without airpower at a moment when it would most sorely be needed. That dire prediction had now come true."<sup>21</sup>

#### MILITARY ADVICE, 1941-1945

During visits to Britain in 1940, Arnold had gained the confidence of Churchill. By January 1943, Hap Arnold was recognized by world leaders as a foremost air power authority. He attended all high level Presidential and world leader conferences, both in Europe and the Pacific as Roosevelt's envoy.<sup>22</sup> Over this time period, Arnold participated in hundreds of decisions which affected the policies, strategies, and the ultimate outcome of the war. I will note seven examples which demonstrated the "authority" of his advice and counsel with world statesmen.

The first was Arnold's personal standing with the President. He was one of the few trusted advisors on the inner circle. He often travelled to both Europe and the Pacific to



relay the President's strategies and plans. His counsel was so valuable to the President, that after his first heart attack, the President waived the military regulations that would have forced Arnold into retirement.

Another demonstration of his credibility was bringing Jimmy Doolittle back on active duty to fly the Presidentially directed raid on Tokyo. Arnold knew Doolittle was the man for the job, and Doolittle volunteered, but it would take an act of Congress to recall him from retirement. Arnold asked Congress, the bill passed, and on April 18, 1942, the Doolittle mission took off for Tokyo.

Arnold's first major world conference, Argentia in the summer of 1941, would start his attendance at every major conference for the rest of the war (save one, the Yalta Conference after suffering his fourth heart attack) as the spokesman for Army aviation. Arnold was often in private meetings with both the President and Churchill. During the Arcadia Conference in December 1941, discussion ensued concerning the command situation in the Far East. Arnold recommended that Mac Arthur be made the commander, with the British General Wavell as the deputy. That was Roosevelt's decision.<sup>23</sup> Also during this conference, Arnold was asked by Churchill to meet with him. Churchill wanted Arnold's opinion

about Air Marshall Portal and other changes he was planning to the British staff.<sup>24</sup>

After the bombing of Pearl Harbor and the entrance of the U.S. into war with Germany and Japan, the U.S. could not support major operations in both theaters of war. At the Arcadia Conference, it was decided that militarily, the only immediate steps the U.S. could take was to start operating heavy bombers from England, which would have great impact on Britain, France and Germany.<sup>25</sup> In April 1942, Arnold and Hopkins were tasked by the President to develop a strategy to overcome Navy and British opposition to the Germany first and the Pacific delaying action strategy.<sup>26</sup> The President approved the Europe first strategy. Greenfield notes that in 1939-1941, our declared national strategy was based on the defense of the Western Hemisphere. Germany was enemy number one, and with the decision of the Allies to give a combined bomber offensive "directed against the vitals of the German nation" priority, it put a major claim on their common war resources for 1943.<sup>27</sup> The combined bomber offensive was the only way immediately available to attack the heart of Germany.

There were two major contentious issues in carrying out the combined bomber campaign. The first was the issue of who would fly American built bombers. The British were having

great difficulties flying and employing the B-17s effectively, giving the aircraft lots of bad press. Arnold pushed both the President and Churchill that as soon as American crews were ready, they would fly the American planes as a general rule.<sup>28</sup> The other issue was day precision bombing (Arnold's preference) or the British night area bombing. Arnold was generally against area bombing because it didn't go after the capacity of a nation to wage war. The British wanted the Allies to do only night area bombing because it was safer and would destroy the will (terror-bombing?) of the Axis to continue the fight. Arnold, at the 1943 Casablanca conference, recommended to Churchill to let the Americans do the day precision bombing and the British continue the night bombing to provide twenty-four hour coverage. This would saturate the German defenses, never giving them time to rest.<sup>29</sup> The decision on both issues went the way Arnold proposed.

At the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, Arnold was asked to "take a walk" with the President. During this time, the President asked for inputs on the selection of the Supreme Commander for the Allied offensive. While Arnold thought Marshall was the ideal choice, he told the President that Marshall was just too valuable in Washington D.C. running the overall war effort. Marshall remained in Washington.<sup>30</sup>

President Truman, Stimson, Marshall and Arnold were the four men who decided to employ the atom bomb against Japan, with the final approval being made by the President. Of the targets available for the drop, Arnold had convinced the President to let the operational air commanders in the Pacific (LeMay and Spaatz) make the decision on which targets would be hit.<sup>31</sup>

While determining the effects or influence that one individual might have on another is often difficult, it can clearly be seen from the previous several examples that Hap Arnold, interacting in the statesman-strategist nexus, exerted significant influence on the President in the development of his policies and strategies.

#### ENDNOTES

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17. Greenfield, Kent Roberts, American Strategy in World War II: A Reconsideration, Westport, Ct, Greenwood Press, 1979, p. 1.

18. Arnold, p. 184.

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24. Ibid., Box 180, notes on White House Conference, Jan. 4, 1942.

25. Ibid., Box 180, notes on White House Conference, Dec. 23, 1941.

26. Ibid., Box 180, White House Conference, Apr. 1, 1942.

27. Greenfield, pp. 4-6.

28. Hap Arnold Collection, Box 180, notes on White House Conference, May 20, 1942; Letter, Roosevelt to Churchill, May 19, 1942.

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30. Ibid., p. 496.

31. Coffey, p. 372.

## CHAPTER V

### CONCLUSIONS

#### IMPACT OF THE RELATIONSHIP

"Pioneer airman, General of the Army and General of the Air Force (and the only military leader to hold both grades), first Air member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Henry Harley Arnold held responsibilities essential to the security and welfare of his country throughout his more than forty-two years of distinguished service."<sup>1</sup>

Those words on the portrait in the Pentagon of General Henry Arnold attest to the level he achieved in the service of his country. To make it so far, there obviously had to be extremely high technical competence and professionalism. But that cannot be all. His last eight years were served at the pleasure of the President, where he helped shape strategy to build an Air Force and helped to win a war. But he didn't just perform as a military man. He was part of the inner circle where statesmen normally operate. He gained the complete confidence and trust of the President, who he represented to world leaders and royalty. His appointment by FDR to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, his promotion to General of the Army, and his visits to foreign countries as Roosevelt's envoy are indicative of the faith that FDR had in Hap Arnold as a soldier and statesman.

And, Roosevelt was not the only one who felt this way about Arnold's activities. Vice-President, and after Roosevelt's death, President Harry Truman had observed Arnold's performance from the Congress and then as Vice-President. In a May 7, 1945 letter from Truman to Arnold, he said, "you have my entire confidence." After the war, Truman sent Arnold on diplomatic missions to Central and South America.

There was no doubt in Arnold's mind that the President was his boss and the President was going to make the prime decisions in prosecuting the war. This was driven home by his nine month ban when he challenged one of the President's programs. After reconciliation, Arnold was a loyal and dedicated servant, almost to the point of killing himself through four heart attacks while serving the President. "Franklin Roosevelt was not only a personal friend, but one of the best friends the Air Force ever had. He had supported me in the development of the Air Force and its global operations to an extent that I never dreamed of a few years before, when I was in the doghouse."<sup>2</sup>

Probably the best example of the value that two Presidents, Congress, and the Country placed on Arnold's service is the following:



Of all American military officers, however, only two have had unique titles, held only by themselves. The first was John J. Pershing who, in 1919, became General of the Armies of the United States, a grade which had been created in 1799 presumably for George Washington, but never filled. The second was Henry H. Arnold who 30 years later was made General of the Air Force. The uniqueness of this grade, and the intent of Congress that it should only apply to Arnold, are clear from the language of the act: "The grade of any individual transferred in the grade of General of the Regular Army to the United States Air Force... is herewith redesignated General of the Air Force."<sup>3</sup>

#### IMPACT OF THE ADVICE

The main claim to fame of the military advice which Arnold provided to the President was the development of air power and the United States Air Force. "He gave the President the air force Roosevelt wanted and had to have..."<sup>4</sup>

Author Greenfield states:

It has been difficult, especially in the U.S., to be objective about the role of air power in WW II. Its rapid rise, and the audacious and still untested claims of American Air Service leaders created sober anxieties as well as an atmosphere of interservice rivalry charged with emotion. It cannot reasonably be maintained that air power was the decisive factor in the sense of being the major factor, in the defeat of Germany and Japan. But that by its application in a new combination with land and sea power, and in overwhelming force, it became a primary factor in defeat of both, is uncontestable.<sup>5</sup>

Most historians agree about the importance of Hap Arnold's vision, strategy, and advice to the President in building up the means that he (FDR) thought would determine the outcome of the war. There can be no question as to Arnold's advice, and the President's subsequent support of building the world's greatest air force--2.4 million personnel, training 105,000 pilots a year, and producing 4,000 airplanes a month.<sup>6</sup> There was no doubt in Arnold's mind as to the impact or importance of air power in bringing World War II to a conclusion. Supporting Arnold's views was German Air Marshall Goering, who said the Germans regarded air power as the decisive factor in their defeat. When asked about which strategy had greater effect, precision or area bombing, Goering replied "precision". The Germans could evacuate their cities, but not move their airfields, railroads, and factories. Goering felt that at the end of the war, Germany could have been defeated by air power alone.<sup>7</sup> While two of the preeminent air power leaders of the time seem to agree air power was decisive in and by itself, there is much evidence to the contrary. Air power had certainly come into its own and was a major factor in bringing the war to conclusion; however, to say it was the decisive factor is too strong.

As to the efficacy of Arnold's advice, it was sought, listened to, and used by what history considers as two of the greatest wartime leaders, Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill, to help bring the most destructive war known to mankind to a successful conclusion for the Allies.

#### SUMMARY

It has been shown that the relationship between Roosevelt, the statesman, and Arnold, the strategist, was mutually beneficial for the war effort and the country. Both men were able to achieve their ultimate goals, winning the war and building an independent air force. Arnold's vast Washington experience, combined with his affable personality, professional competence, hard-driving dedication, and strategic vision, enabled him to gain the President's confidence and be moved to the "inner circle." It was here that Arnold's sage counsel to the Commander-in-Chief, over a broad range of issues that had both military and political implications, was sought and implemented by Roosevelt to help ensure an Allied victory in World War II. Of all the strategists, Hap Arnold served his statesman the longest, for 86 months, with George Marshall serving for 78 months. No other military strategist from World War II comes close to this time of service. Arnold had a

strong, positive influence on the strategies and policies executed by his President. The importance of the nexus between the strategist and the statesman should not be underestimated.

What has been the role of the strategist since this global war, when the whole nation was mobilized to achieve common ends? What will be the future role of the strategist be?

Author Betts states:

Influence, defined here as causing decision makers to do something they probably would not have done otherwise, is one of the most important and illusive concepts in the study of politics. In decisions on the use of force it is impossible to detect objectively whose influence is the greatest; it can only be inferred because only the President--and maybe not even he--really knows what convinces him to change his mind.

Direct military influence on policy, on the other hand, has declined since its apex in WW II. The Joint Chiefs fell from being the President's primary advisors on global policy during the war, when the State Department was weak and no authorities intervened between them and President Roosevelt, to a lesser role under Truman.<sup>8</sup>

A pointed example of reduced Presidential access that Betts refers to was during the Vietnam War during the Johnson administration. The Chairman of the JCS only saw the President seven times, and never without his civilian overseer, the Secretary of Defense. We have seen a great strengthening of the civilian governmental departments and agencies and the

controls being established over the military and its use (The War Powers Act). And, we must observe that Betts wrote his book in 1977. Since then, the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 established even greater controls over the influence of the military, with just the Chairman serving as the President's primarily military advisor.

It is hard to envision a scenario where the military advisors ever become as close and as powerful as was observed during World War II. So, what does this mean for those senior military leaders who are going to provide military advice to the President and his staff? They must have unquestioned integrity, credibility, and loyalty. Their positions will require they be articulate in front of the Congress and the media, and very important, be savvy in the ways and means of politics. If they are any less, the military services will be ineffectually represented. In today's environment, brass knuckle determination, as demonstrated by Arnold, won't make the grade--the "operator" will be out of his environment.

The difficulty, this lack of preparedness of the soldier to be able to interface with the statesman might best be highlighted by what General Arnold himself, a soldier who had dealt directly for four years with heads of state and royalty around the world, had experienced. Travelling after the war on

Presidential business for one and a half years, Arnold, trying to implement what he thought were the President's desires, kept running into bottlenecks with our own State Department! He observed, "At that point I began to run into diplomats. It is awfully hard for a practical soldier to understand the manner in which the minds of diplomats work."<sup>9</sup> This is the challenge for those strategists who will become involved with statesmen.

#### ENDNOTES

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